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9 May 1960



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK
Czechoslovakia: Khrushchev was persuaded by Czechoslovak party boss Novotny, during the latter's visit to Moscow from 2 to 4 May, to put in an appearance at the Prague liberation celebrations which began on 7 May, according to rumors again circulating in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet ambassador in Prague told the French ambassador there was a good possibility that Khrushchev would appear in Prague before the summit meetings. The personal attention which Novotny received from the Soviet leader during his Moscow stay also suggests that reported differences between the two countries--including Czech opposition to the policy of detente--have been resolved, and that Khrushchev might visit Prague prior to the summit to demonstrate unanimity of views.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

OK
Turkey: Local security forces reinforced by army units are maintaining order in Turkish cities, but the political atmosphere remains tense and new disorders could break out. A majority of the governing Democratic party's parliamentary deputies is reported opposed to the further use of "abnormal" methods to suppress the opposition Republican People's party. Premier Menderes is believed to be seeking a meeting with opposition leader Ismet Inonu in an attempt to reduce tension.

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Venezuela-Caribbean: [President Betancourt has threatened to withdraw from the Organization of American States (OAS) if the US does not take a positive stand in the organization against Dominican dictator Trujillo. Withdrawal could severely damage the prestige of the OAS, long an object of attack by Cuban Prime Minister Castro and by the Communists as an instrument of "US imperialism." Betancourt has become increasingly frustrated with OAS "ineffectiveness" against his long-standing enemy Trujillo, but he plans to file a complaint with the OAS charging Trujillo with intervention in connection with the 20-21 April military uprising in Venezuela. Although Betancourt is completely disenchanted with Castro, he believes that the approach to the Cuban problem is through the electoral process.]

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Cuba-USSR: The 7 May announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Castro regime and the Soviet Union formalizes increasingly close economic and political ties since Mikoyan's visit to Cuba last February, when a five-year trade pact and a \$100,000,000 Soviet credit were announced.

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OK

[redacted] Cuba will also establish diplomatic relations with Communist China in due course.] The Soviet Embassy in Havana will be the fourth in Latin America for the USSR, which now has diplomatic missions in Mexico, Uruguay, and Argentina.

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev Reportedly to Visit Czechoslovakia

Khrushchev was persuaded by Czechoslovak party boss Novotny during the latter's visit to Moscow from 2-4 May, according to the latest in a series of rumors circulating in Czechoslovakia, to put in an appearance at the Prague liberation celebrations which began on 7 May. The plausibility of the rumors was somewhat enhanced by the Soviet ambassador's statement to the French ambassador that there is a good possibility Khrushchev will appear in Prague before the summit meetings, which are scheduled to begin on 16 May. A major aim of such a visit probably would be to counteract Western reports of differences between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and give the appearance of a unanimity of views.

The cordial treatment accorded Novotny last week was in sharp contrast to the snub he received in Moscow during the Warsaw Pact meetings in February, when for unknown reasons Khrushchev failed to receive him for a private interview, although he received leaders of all the other East European delegations. Khrushchev reportedly also failed to honor an invitation to visit Prague on his return from Paris in April.

There have been indications that Czechoslovak-Soviet relations have been troubled by Czech misgivings about the Soviet policy of East-West detente and by Czech support for certain Chinese Communist policies distasteful to Khrushchev. Czechoslovakia generally has taken a negative line toward international detente.

The highest ranking satellite leader to attend the Chinese tenth anniversary celebrations in September 1959, Novotny praised Chinese progress-- in spite of Khrushchev's reserved comments--and said that China should serve as an example for underdeveloped nations on the way to Communism.

A long delay in appointing a successor to the former Soviet ambassador in Prague led to wide speculation that the ambassador

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had been withdrawn at Czech request as a result of differences between the two countries. Novotny's recent announcement that Czechoslovakia was, in effect, just behind the USSR in building Communism, as well as his reaffirmation of this stand with apparent Soviet approval during his latest Moscow visit, may indicate a Soviet concession to the ambitious but harried Czech party boss. [REDACTED]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Internal Turkish Situation Improves

Istanbul and Ankara, scenes of the most violent demonstrations against the government between 28 April and 5 May, are quiet, and curfew restrictions have been reduced. Security forces, backed up by army troops, appear to have the situation well under control. Many student leaders in the demonstrations remain under detention; the others appear disorganized. The political situation in Turkey remains tense, however, and new violence could occur at any time--possibly in the smaller cities, to which many students have returned following the closing of the universities in Istanbul and Ankara.

Recent meetings of the governing Democratic party's parliamentary group have demonstrated the existence of a split in party ranks between the moderates and those favoring a more extreme policy toward the opposition Republican People's party (RPP). The extremists have proposed the lifting of parliamentary immunity and arrest of RPP leaders for instigating the recent riots, the suppression of that party, and the establishment of "people's courts" to try RPP leaders. The moderates, reportedly a majority of the parliamentary group and possibly including Premier Menderes, have opposed these moves. Several moderates have called for the abolition of the investigating commission set up by the National Assembly on 18 April to examine the "illegal and subversive" acts of the RPP--an act which led directly to the present unstable political situation.

25X1 [redacted] Menderes may have authorized feelers to RPP leader Ismet Inonu to determine if the latter will meet with him in an effort to reduce tensions. It appears doubtful that Inonu would meet with Menderes while the parliamentary investigation--repeatedly denounced by him as illegal--continues.

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Venezuelan President Urges US Stand Against Trujillo

[Venezuelan President Betancourt has threatened to withdraw from the Organization of American States (OAS) if the United States does not take a positive stand against Dominican dictator Trujillo in that organization. Such a withdrawal could severely damage the prestige of the OAS, long an object of attack by Cuban Prime Minister Castro and Communists in the hemisphere as an instrument of "US imperialism." Moscow and Peiping radios have consistently supported this propaganda theme.]

[Betancourt advised Ambassador Sparks that he is under pressure from the military for direct retaliation against the Dominican Republic, charging that three Dominican planes are standing by for an air strike against Venezuela. Top Venezuelan government officials have previously indicated that military action against Trujillo's regime is a strong possibility.]

[Betancourt, who has become increasingly frustrated with OAS "ineffectiveness" against his long-standing enemy Trujillo, is nevertheless planning to file a complaint with the OAS charging the Dominican dictator with intervention in Venezuelan affairs, in connection with Dominican involvement in the 20-21 April military uprising in Venezuela. Betancourt has invited Colombia, which recently broke relations with the Dominican regime, to join him in this move, and he believes other Latin American countries will soon follow suit. The Peruvian government on 7 May suspended diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic, and described this move as "an act of solidarity with the sister republics of Venezuela and Colombia in defense of representative democracy."]

[Although Betancourt is completely disenchanted with Castro, he is of the opinion that the approach to the Cuban problem is to build up pressure on Castro to hold elections. His contention is that Castro would have to govern democratically after elections or expose himself as a dictator.]

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